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PROTECTING THE STATES FROM ELECTORAL INVASIONS
Drew Marvel*

Protecting systems from cyberthreats from nation-states can really
only be done on a national level. It’s insane we have state-level
control of these systems.
—Dave Aitel, former National Security Agency security scientist1
INTRODUCTION
Since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the threat of foreign interference in
U.S. elections has loomed large in the minds of the American public.2 During the
2016 campaign season, Russian government-backed hackers infiltrated the networks
and computers of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), and various campaign officials, harvesting
private information and installing spyware and malware for ongoing intelligence
purposes.3 U.S. intelligence officials have indicated that, using similar tactics, the
Russian hackers also targeted election systems and officials in all fifty states,4 successfully breaching at least two of those states’ election systems, Illinois and Florida.5
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2020; BA, University of Maryland,
Baltimore County, 2017. Thank you to the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal staff for their
edits, and a big shout out to Mike and Andrea for their support and direction early on. Many
thanks to Professors Rebecca Green and Tara Grove for their encouragement and suggestions
during the writing process. Finally, thanks to my Mom and Dad, my sisters Ashley and Brittany,
my brothers-in-law Ben and Scottie, and Sofie, Wes and Archer for keeping me sane throughout this endeavor.
1
Derek Hawkins, Elections Remain Vulnerable to Hacking, Experts Say, PROVIDENCE
J. (May 26, 2018, 8:16 PM), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20180526/elections
-remain-vulnerable-to-hacking-experts-say [https://perma.cc/8JPQ-GSQQ].
2
See, e.g., Sabrina Siddiqui, Half of Americans See Fake News as Bigger Threat than
Terrorism, Study Finds, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2019, 8:53 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/us-news/2019/jun/06/fake-news-how-misinformation-became-the-new-front-in-us-political
-warfare [https://perma.cc/U3W5-8RV6].
3
See 1 ROBERT S. MUELLER III, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 36–41 (2019) [hereinafter
MUELLER REPORT].
4
Sean Gallagher, DHS, FBI Say Election Systems in All 50 States Were Targeted in 2016,
ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2019, 2:20 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology
/2019/04/dhs-fbi-say-election-systems-in-50-states-were-targeted-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc
/E8WL-XUAP].
5
See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 3, at 50–51. In July 2016, Russian hackers used a
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The purpose of these hacks was not to damage or otherwise incapacitate the nation’s
electoral infrastructure, but rather to gather information that could be used in a larger,
comprehensive, and ongoing misinformation campaign designed to undermine the
public’s trust in democratic and governmental institutions, influence public opinion
and, ultimately, impact the election itself.6
The Russian campaign in 2016 was wildly successful, and the U.S. intelligence
community has made it clear that the Russians have every intention of continuing
these types of malign cyber-operations in future elections.7 Although Russia may be
the poster child for this type of electoral interference, U.S. officials have stated that
other foreign powers have taken note of the Russian success and will likely be engaged
in similar sorts of ideological warfare in the years to come.8 This new threat has
prompted ongoing discussions regarding the country’s election security and state
and local officials’ preparedness—or rather lack thereof—to handle this growing national security issue. Many of these debates involve questions of federalism given the
overlapping governmental interests and responsibilities this issue implicates: election
administration, a constitutional privilege entrusted to the states; and national security,
a sphere traditionally understood to fall under the federal government’s domain.9
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution undoubtedly recognized that foreign
threats would always pose a danger to the United States’ continued independence,
and, to that end, they debated at length to achieve the most effective and efficient
allocation of governmental defense responsibilities between the states and the
federal government.10 Naturally, a document written in the late eighteenth century,
technique called “SQL injection” to breach the computers at the Illinois State Board of Election,
allowing them to steal the personal information of about 500,000 Illinois voters. Chuck
Goudie & Christine Tressel, How the Russians Penetrated Illinois Election Computers, ABC7
CHI. (July 19, 2018), https://abc7chicago.com/politics/how-the-russians-penetrated-illinois
-election-computers/3778816/ [https://perma.cc/3RF2-BBNT]. Similarly, in 2016, Russian
hackers used a technique called “spearphishing” to breach the election systems of two undisclosed counties in Florida. Patricia Mazzei, Russians Hacked Voter Systems in 2 Florida
Counties. But Which Ones?, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2Q6yXTl.
6
See MUELLER REPORT, supra note 3, at 36–50.
7
See Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat.’l Intelligence, Joint Statement from the
ODNI, DOJ, FBI and DHS: Combating Foreign Influence in U.S. Elections (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2018/item/1915-joint
-statement-from-the-odni-doj-fbi-and-dhs-combating-foreign-influence-in-u-s-elections
[https://perma.cc/T5CP-XBRT] [hereinafter Joint Statement].
8
See U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, RUSSIAN TARGETING OF ELECTION
INFRASTRUCTURE DURING THE 2016 ELECTION: SUMMARY OF INITIAL FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 8, 2018), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files
/publications/RussRptInstlmt1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5LN-AZBQ] [hereinafter S. REP. SUMMARY ON RUSSIAN TARGETING].
9
See, e.g., R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45302, FEDERAL ROLE IN U.S.
CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS: AN OVERVIEW 1, 4–5 (2018).
10
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
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a time when warfare was strictly understood to be a tangible threat, could not have
predicted that the United States’ democratic processes could be attacked without the
enemy ever needing to step foot on American soil. Notwithstanding the Framers’
unfamiliarity with modern day technology, they nonetheless contemplated the two
governmental responsibilities foreign electoral interference directly implicates: maintaining a republican form of government in the states and defending the nation from
foreign invasions. Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution specifically entrusts
the federal government with these dual obligations, proclaiming “[t]he United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion.”11 Based on the plain text and underlying rationale of these provisions, it is clear that if alive today, the Framers would
consider defending the states against foreign electoral interference as an obligatory
duty falling squarely on the federal government’s shoulders.
This Note takes the position that foreign election interference and hacking attempts
should be understood as an “invasion” within the scope of Article IV, Section 4.
This “invasion” poses an acute and unique risk to the states’ “Republican Form[s] of
Government”12 such that the federal government has a constitutional duty to defend
against it. It is important to note that the argument here does not posit an affirmative,
judicially enforceable obligation on the federal government to act. Rather, “duty”
should be understood as a judicially cognizable constitutional basis that further justifies greater federal involvement in and support of election security and administration.13 Nor does this Note advocate for a sweeping, pre-emptive, one-size-fits-all
federal legislative or regulatory framework for election administration. Such action
would not only completely divest state and local jurisdictions of a constitutionally
vested power, but would also likely create more problems than it would purportedly
solve. Historically, the states have always fiercely resisted attempts by the federal
government to interpose itself into the states’ administration of elections, and the
prospect of a complete federal takeover would in all likelihood make implementation near impossible.14 Instead, this Note advocates for the federal government to
take a more proactive role in assisting states and localities to fund and secure their
election systems generally, and further articulates why such action would be both consistent with the Framers’ intentions and beneficial to the nation’s national security
as a whole.
Part I provides a general overview of the current state of election administration
and security in the U.S. It also discusses how systematic problems with funding,
11

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added).
Id.
13
See generally, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE
L.J. 1836 (2015).
14
See generally Alan Greenblatt, State Election Officials Fear Feds Are Making Security
Worse, GOVERNING (July 12, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/politics
/gov-elections-states-federalism-trump.html [https://perma.cc/XYT3-WUJU].
12
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varying cybersecurity standards and expertise, and inconsistent sharing and reporting
of information can be exploited and exacerbated in the context of foreign interference attempts. Part II then briefly discusses how the federal Elections Clause provides the constitutional authority for the national government to legislate and regulate election administration, as well as highlighting federal legislation that already
exists in this area. Finally, Part III examines the challenges involved in applying existing international law to non-damaging cyber-operations like the Russian election
hacks and attempts to characterize them through comparison to the 2014 Sony hack.
It also analyzes the Framers’ intent and rationale for their inclusion of Article IV,
Section 4 and how its text and structure command the importance with which they
viewed the provision’s obligations.
I. THE SWISS CHEESE OF ELECTION SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE
The U.S. Constitution places the primary responsibility for holding and administering elections with the states, thereby making the nation’s election systems
decentralized by default.15 Most states have further delegated many election administration responsibilities to local jurisdictions, creating a “hyperfederalized”16
electoral infrastructure comprised of thousands of independent systems.17 Many
security experts have lauded the heavily decentralized model as an effective security
mechanism.18 The “disjointed nature” of American elections means that for a hostile
actor to infiltrate and manipulate elections on a wide scale, they would need to
breach a multitude of systems successfully, each with its own unique security
measures to overcome.19 The decentralized system acts as a failsafe of sorts, containing any would-be successful hacker’s access to only those systems compromised.20
This model, however, is a double-edged sword because the aspects that make
it more secure also make it more difficult to defend against security threats, to
respond to security breaches, and to assess the nation’s systems as a whole.21 States
and counties vary widely in the types of hardware, software, and accompanying
15

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”).
16
ALEC C. EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN SUFFRAGE 3 (2009).
17
See Chris Good, When it Comes to Election Cybersecurity, Decentralized System is
Viewed as Both Blessing and Curse, ABC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2018, 1:20 PM), https://abcnews.go
.com/Politics/election-cybersecurity-decentralized-system-viewed-blessing-curse/story?id=588
77082 [https://perma.cc/X59B-S89P] (stating that “elections [are] overseen by about 10,000
different voting jurisdictions across the 50 states.”).
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
See id.
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cybersecurity standards they require for their voting machines, voter registration systems, pollbooks, post-election vote tabulation, recording, and certification processes,22
and in the overall regulation of private vendors they employ to provide these functions.23 The lack of consistent federal funding for election technology upgrades and
cybersecurity training leaves the under-resourced states and counties on their own
to defend themselves against hostile cyber-attacks, a task too great for many of them.24
The current system produces a “Swiss cheese” of electoral infrastructure with thousands
of potentially vulnerable entry points for hostile actors to target and exploit to the
detriment of the entire nation.25
A. Funding
There exists today a vast disparity among jurisdictions in the capability to fund
improvements for voting machine technology26—meaning both the physical machines voters actually use to cast their votes and the software on which those
machines run. The modern trend in election administration funding can be traced
back to the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA),27 which was passed in the
22

See Alan Greenblatt, States Face Challenges on the Road to Better Election Security,
GOV’T TECH. (July 19, 2018), http://www.govtech.com/security/States-Face-Challenges-on
-the-Road-to-Better-Election-Security.html [https://perma.cc/S5A8-9CGS]; Lily Hay Newman,
Election Security Is Still Hurting at Every Level, WIRED (June 6, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://
wired.com/story/election-security-2020/ [https://perma.cc/84Q9-KAU7]. See generally Danielle
Root et al., Election Security in All 50 States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 12, 2018, 12:01
AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/02/12/446336/elec
tion-security-50-states/ [https://perma.cc/788K-E47R] (detailing levels of election security in
the fifty states).
23
See Greenblatt, supra note 22 (“No matter how many steps government officials take
to improve their own security efforts, they face potential exposure if they’re using vendors
whose efforts are more lax.”).
24
On June 18, 2019, a group of twenty-two bipartisan state Attorneys General signed onto
a joint letter to Senate leadership imploring Congress to provide more assistance to secure
their election systems. The Attorneys General called for increased funding, more cybersecurity
training, and federal legislation specifically aimed at bolstering election security, stating “[o]ur
state and local election officials are on the front-lines of the fight to protect our election
infrastructure, but they lack the resources necessary to combat a sophisticated foreign adversary like Russia.” Letter from Keith Ellison, Minn. Att’y Gen., to Chairs of S. Comm. on
Appropriations and S. Comm. on Rules and Administration (June 18, 2019), http://www.ag
.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2019/Documents/ElectionSecurityLetter.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9KBW-DV4D] [hereinafter Att’ys Gen. Letter to S. Comms.].
25
Shannon Vavra, There’s More Than One Way to Hack an Election, AXIOS (July 3,
2018), https://www.axios.com/be-smart-there-is-more-than-one-way-to-hack-an-election-152
9424861-1e0c75d9-32b8-4a85-98b3-47d5a853fdeb.html [https://perma.cc/DAH9-QZFJ].
26
See Newman, supra note 22.
27
Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 10, 36, 42, and
52 U.S.C. (2012)).
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wake of Bush v. Gore28 and its controversy surrounding Florida’s punch-card ballots
in the 2000 presidential election.29 Through HAVA, Congress offered states approximately $3.9 billion in federal funds to assist in the administration of federal elections
and to upgrade their aging voting equipment with the latest technology in an effort
to improve ballot “accuracy and accessibility.”30 With the exception of setting
requirements for the types of voting machines that could be acquired, Congress left
the states with considerable discretion as to how they could spend their HAVA
funds.31 Congress gave the states four years to spend their HAVA money, after which
point any excess funds were to be returned to the federal government.32 With minimal
direction from the federal government and limited time to spend the funds, most
states made the short-sighted decision to outright purchase the latest voting machine
technology of that time.33
Unfortunately, HAVA’s one-time, time-pressured grant of funds to the states
has had the unintended effect of leaving jurisdictions stuck with their now outdated
voting machines purchased with HAVA funds.34 The few private manufacturers of
HAVA compliant voting machines incurred an economic windfall in the form of state
procurements which fueled a monopolization of the nearly “$300-million-a-year”
industry.35 Today, eighty percent of the nation’s voting machines are under the control
of three companies,36 and the average cost of recent machines falls “between $2,500
and $3,000 each.”37 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,
local “election boards should budget for one machine per every 250 to 300 registered
voters,”38 and the Brennan Center for Justice has estimated that the cost of replacing
all of the nation’s existing machines would exceed $1 billion.39
28

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Karyn L. Bass, Are We Really Over the Hill Yet? The Voting Rights Act at Forty Years:
Actual and Constructive Disenfranchisement in the Wake of Election 2000 and Bush v. Gore,
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 111, 111–14, 153 n.294 (2004).
30
Brandon Fail, Comment, HAVA’s Unintended Consequences: A Lesson for Next Time,
116 YALE L.J. 493, 493 n.4, 495 (2006); Kim Zetter, The Crisis of Election Security, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2N3hoAh.
31
See Fail, supra note 30, at 495–96; Zetter, supra note 30.
32
See Help America Vote Act § 102(a)(3)(A)–(B), (d)(1).
33
Fail, supra note 30, at 496–97.
34
See id. at 494.
35
See Zetter, supra note 30.
36
Id.
37
Sarah Breitenbach, Aging Voting Machines Cost Local, State Governments, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs
/stateline/2016/03/02/aging-voting-machines-cost-local-state-governments [https://perma.cc
/4D6K-9F2Z].
38
Id.
39
LAWRENCE NORDEN & CHRISTOPHER FAMIGHETTI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
AMERICA’S VOTING MACHINES AT RISK 17 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/publica
tion/americas-voting-machines-risk [https://perma.cc/9N8R-C2FM].
29
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The average lifespan of voting machines is estimated at around ten years, at
which point the likelihood of malfunctions and problems with the machines’ systems
increases.40 Although experts say the lifespan of voting machines could be extended
somewhat with proper maintenance, jurisdictions in forty-three states are using
machines that are no longer manufactured, thereby making it increasingly difficult for
those areas’ election officials to find replacement parts and technicians.41 Despite the
technological risks, jurisdictions in forty-one states used machines purchased more than
ten years ago in the 2018 mid-term elections.42 This prevalence of outdated voting
machines is in no way caused by ignorant or dismissive election officials, but rather by
the fiscal realities that these state and local jurisdictions face. Officials in thirty-three
states have indicated a need to purchase new election machines before 2020, however
a majority of those officials have stated that they lack the adequate funding to do so.43
The intense decentralization of election administration further complicates this
issue, as states vary in their allocation of the funds for election machines and systems.
Just under half of the states have in place a “uniform voting system” wherein all
voting equipment is purchased and funded at the state level.44 Such a financing
structure posed a viable option back when HAVA funds were readily available, but
the dearth of federal funding in the years since HAVA’s passage has left many of
these states unable to provide the requisite funds now needed to replace outdated
equipment.45 A handful of states split the financial burden; they pay for a portion of
their voting equipment with state funds and require counties and local jurisdictions
provide the remainder.46 Finally, some states leave the costs entirely up to local jurisdictions and only provide state funding in the rare instances where newly enacted state
laws require certain upgrades to machines.47
40

Id. at 8.
Id. at 9. The Brennan Center for Justice found that nine states are exclusively using discontinued voting machines and thirty-four states are using discontinued voting machines in
one or more jurisdictions. LAWRENCE NORDEN & WILFRED U. CODRINGTON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, AMERICA’S VOTING MACHINES AT RISK—AN UPDATE n.17 (Mar. 8, 2018), https://
www.brennancenter.org/analysis/americas-voting-machines-risk-an-update [https://perma.cc
/FE2T-GRCY].
42
NORDEN & CODRINGTON, supra note 41.
43
Wilfred Codrington III & Iris Zhang, Secure the Vote, Secure Our Democracy, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP (Feb. 23, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jef
ferson-street/articles/2018-02-23/congress-must-act-to-upgrade-and-secure-our-voting-ma
chines-before-midterms [https://perma.cc/9MF8-MGWL]; see also NORDEN & FAMIGHETTI,
supra note 39, at 18.
44
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE PRICE OF DEMOCRACY: SPLITTING
THE BILL FOR ELECTIONS 12–13 (Feb. 14, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and
-campaigns/the-price-of-democracy-splitting-the-bill-for-elections.aspx [https://perma.cc
/TE4G-R84P].
45
See id.
46
Id. at 13.
47
Id.
41
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Lacking adequate funding, those state and local jurisdictions with less financial
resources at their disposal are unable to purchase the costly—yet needed—upgrades
and maintenance to their election systems. More often, those jurisdictions are forced
to divert their limited supply of funds to higher priority items and governmental functions such as infrastructure.48 These inequities fall disproportionately on less affluent
jurisdictions.49 As such, the voters in these jurisdictions are more prone to voting machine malfunctions, problems on election day, and generally more susceptible to security breaches—flaws which erode the public’s confidence in the democratic system.50
In March 2018, Congress used HAVA’s appropriation authority to allocate an
additional $380 million to the states and territories51 for the purpose of bolstering
their election security systems in response to the foreign interference attempts to the
2016 presidential election.52 Representing the largest batch of federal funding for
election infrastructure in over a decade,53 it took until July 16, 2018, for the entire
amount to be requested and distributed to state officials.54 There can be no doubt that
this financial assistance delivered much needed aid to the fiscally strapped state
election officials, but many states say that their allocation was not sufficient to make
all of the improvements and expenditures necessary to update and secure their
election machines and systems statewide.55
Although the 2018 federal funds were restricted to certain permitted uses such
as replacing outdated voting machines, implementing a post-election audit process,
upgrading computer systems to address vulnerabilities, and cybersecurity training
for election officials, the specific uses of the funds are once again left to the individual
states’ discretion.56 Unfortunately, because most states need to make improvements
48

See NORDEN & FAMIGHETTI, supra note 39, at 18–19.
See id. at 19.
50
See id. at 6–7, 12, 16, 19.
51
See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348,
561–62 (2018).
52
See SAMUELE DOMINIONI, ITALIAN INST. FOR INT’L POLITICAL STUDIES, PROTECTING
ELECTORAL INTEGRITY IN CYBERSPACE: THE U.S. MID-TERM ELECTION IN 2018, at 4 (2018).
53
Miles Parks, Bureaucracy and Politics Slow Election Security Funding to States, NPR
(June 18, 2018, 7:28 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/18/617874348/bureaucracy-and-poli
tics-slow-election-security-funding-to-states [https://perma.cc/738Z-Z2B8].
54
Press Release, U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, U.S. Election Assistance Commission Announces All Eligible States & Territories Have Requested HAVA Funds, U.S. EAC
(July 16, 2018), https://www.eac.gov/news/2018/07/16/us-election-assistance-commission
-announces-all-eligible-states-and-territories-have-requested-hava-funds/ [https://perma.cc
/BW9Q-3C3X] [hereinafter EAC Press Release].
55
See Eric Geller, States Slow to Prepare for Hacking Threats, POLITICO (July 18, 2018,
5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/18/hackers-states-elections-upgrades-729
054 [https://perma.cc/A25Z-35K2]. Officials in Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska and Texas have
all indicated that this most recent round of federal funding was not enough to overhaul their
statewide election systems. Id.; see also Att’ys Gen. Letter to S. Comms., supra note 24.
56
See Erin Kelly, States Will Get at Least $3 Million Each to Improve Election Security
49
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in many or even all of these areas, the discretionary investments that states choose
to make with their limited resources may not go towards addressing the most pressing issues or vulnerabilities in their election systems.57 For example, of the five states
which rely solely on paperless, electronic voting machines—considered by cybersecurity experts to be a top vulnerability in election security—none plan on using the
funds to purchase new, more secure voting equipment like those with paper ballot
trails.58 Simply being awarded federal funding does not signify a remedy to a state’s
problems either, as the issue of election security and the disbursement of federal funds
in some jurisdictions has been stalled by intrastate political squabbles.59
B. Cybersecurity
Nearly every step in the electoral process is now done, at least partially, through
digital means—making voter registration databases, pollbooks used to check in voters
on election day, voting machine software, vote tabulation software, and the final
verification and online reporting of election results all potential targets for hackers.60
Much like with funding, the heavily decentralized system means that state and local
jurisdictions vary widely in the minimum cybersecurity standards and requirements
imposed on their election machines, election systems, and the vendors who provide
them.61 As the 2018 mid-term elections have demonstrated, the threat of interference
from hostile foreign actors, beyond just Russia, continues to loom over the U.S.
democratic process,62 and the overwhelming consensus of cybersecurity experts is
that state election systems remain vulnerable.63 Though reluctant at first, state and
Under Spending Deal, USA TODAY (Mar. 22, 2018, 2:09 PM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/politics/2018/03/22/states-get-least-3-million-each-improve-election-security-under
-spending-deal/449562002/ [https://perma.cc/QF9W-STJU].
57
See Geller, supra note 55.
58
Id.
59
See Parks, supra note 53.
60
See Scott J. Shackelford et al., Making Democracy Harder to Hack, 50 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 629, 636 (2017). See generally Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: We Surveyed 100 Security Experts. Almost All Said State Election Systems Were Vulnerable, WASH.
POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cy
bersecurity-202/2018/05/21/the-cybersecurity-202-we-surveyed-100-security-experts-almost
-all-said-state-election-systems-were-vulnerable/5b0189b030fb0425887995e2/ [https://perma
.cc/YCH5-ZSPP] (surveying voter systems and their weaknesses throughout the country).
61
See Voting System Standards, Testing and Certification, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 6, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voting
-system-standards-testing-and-certification.aspx [https://perma.cc/9786-QAKE] [hereinafter
Standards, Testing & Certification].
62
See Dan Patterson, These Are the Hackers Targeting the Midterm Election, CBS NEWS
(Oct. 10, 2018, 10:50 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/these-are-the-hackers-targeting-the
-midterm-election/ [https://perma.cc/CY6M-ERN2]; see also Joint Statement, supra note 7.
63
See Hawkins, supra note 60.
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local election officials are increasingly taking note of the serious danger facing them;64
some experts, however, believe “the magnitude of the threats from state-sponsored
adversaries is too great for states to deal with alone.”65
1. Voting Machines
As the nation’s voting machines remain in service beyond their lifespans, they
become not only more prone to malfunctioning,66 but also more susceptible to cyberattacks.67 Many older voting machines, including those purchased with the original
HAVA grants, run on outdated and unsupported software like Windows 2000 that,
in addition to no longer receiving security patches,68 is itself more vulnerable to the
latest forms of hacking.69 Notwithstanding the fact that voting machines are supposed to be disconnected from the internet, in order to load software and ballot
definitions the machines need to connect with an election management computer,
which can be connected to the internet.70 Through this proxy, a hacker could potentially corrupt a single voting machine that, because voting machines connect locally
and exchange information through memory cards, could then allow an experienced
nation-state actor to corrupt an entire jurisdiction’s machines.71
Although the likelihood of such an intricate and sophisticated hacking attempt
actually occurring, let alone succeeding, might seem remote, there is ample evidence
of states failing to address—or even identify—far less complex vulnerabilities in
their voting machines’ security that would be much easier to exploit.72 For instance,
in 2014, the Virginia State Board of Elections learned that twenty percent of their
precincts’ voting machines were in fact equipped with wireless network capabilities
to allow ballot programming and voter data to be transmitted between machines.73
64
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The machine’s network capabilities were discovered on Election Day and only after one
county’s poll workers became concerned when their machines repeatedly crashed.74
State auditors investigating the machines eventually learned that anyone nearby
could easily access the voting machines’ network with their smartphones—the password was “abcde”—offering access to see and edit the lists of candidates available,
the number actual votes cast, and the final totals recorded, among other things.75
The most effective security measure against older voting machines being hacked
is the creation of a paper ballot trail recording the voter’s choices that can later be used
to verify the accuracy of the votes entered and recorded on the machine’s computer.76
And yet, despite years of federal officials and cybersecurity experts advising otherwise,77 in the 2018 election, thirteen states used paperless electronic voting machines
as their primary voting equipment in at least some of their local jurisdictions.78 Five
of those states continue to use paperless voting machines in all of their state polling
locations.79 The principle utility of having paper ballots to supplement electronic
voting machines is that it allows officials to conduct post-election audits of machines to verify the accuracy of the software-generated final vote tally.80 Specifically, “risk limiting audits,” a process which uses statistical models to consistently
provide a high level of confidence in final tabulation results, is considered by experts
to be the “‘gold standard’ of post-election audits”81 and has been specifically recommended by the Senate Intelligence Committee.82 Once again, contrary to expert
opinion and congress’s recommendation, only three states require risk limiting audits
for their voting equipment.83 Without paper ballots to conduct these audits regularly,
it is possible that hacking attempts or errors in the voting machine’s software will go
unnoticed by state and local election officials.84 As America’s voting machines continue to age and the prevalence of machine malfunctions rises,85 these audits become
NPR (Apr. 16, 2015, 5:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/04/16/3999
86331/hacked-touchscreen-voting-machine-raises-questions-about-election-security [https://
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only more imperative as even small instances of malfunction, whether external or
internal in origin, can change the outcome of a race.86
Demonstrative of the issues that the absence of a paper trail can cause is the
2006 election in Florida’s 13th Congressional district, where fifteen percent of the ballots cast in said district did not register a vote in that race—one of the most vehemently contested races that year.87 It is highly unlikely that roughly 18,000 voters
chose not to record a vote in only that race, given the statistical significance of under
votes in the affected area was nearly thirteen percent higher than in other counties.88
Unfortunately, due to the absence of paper ballots to verify the final electronic vote
tabulation, it will remain unknown whether the undervotes were in fact an accurate
reflection of the 18,000 voters’ preferences or were instead the result of a software
malfunction with the machines themselves.89 Out of more than 238,000 votes in that
district, the winner of that race won by a margin of only 369 votes.90
2. Voter Registration Databases & Election Websites
Considered by many experts to be the most vulnerable targets for hackers are
voter registration systems and databases.91 Although not directly tied to the votes
cast or to the election results, these systems tell election officials who can vote,
identify registered voters and are overall crucial to an efficient operation on election
day.92 HAVA required states to create and maintain computerized voter registration
lists,93 and so these “back end” systems used by states and counties are almost entirely digital and connected to the internet, either directly or indirectly.94 HAVA also
required states to “provide adequate technological security measures to prevent the
unauthorized access to the computerized list[s],” but it did not require the EAC to
develop specific technological and security standards for those systems.95 Therefore,
it was left to state and local jurisdictions to develop sufficient security measures for protecting their databases, many of whom have further delegated these responsibilities
to private vendors. Unfortunately, many states and their affiliated private vendors
86
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have failed to adequately secure their systems—leaving the door open for hostile
foreign actors to take advantage.96
In 2016, the Russian military-backed hackers successfully infiltrated Illinois’s
statewide voter registration system, giving them access to Illinois voter files for
nearly three weeks before they were detected after trying to alter or delete records
in the database.97 Although not confirmed, it is believed that Illinois is the unnamed
state mentioned in an indictment filed by Special Counsel Robert Mueller as part of
his investigation into the 2016 election interference98 that alleged hackers were able
to steal information including names, addresses, partial Social Security numbers,
and driver’s license numbers of 500,000 voters.99
This danger is not reserved to the state level nor is it unique to hostile foreign
actors. In Arizona, hackers were successfully able to install malware on a county
election official’s computer when he opened a fraudulent email attachment.100 Through
that computer the hackers were able to obtain the county official’s username and
password which could then be used to access the county voting registration system.101
Initially, the hackers in Arizona were widely believed to be a part of the Russian
interference campaign;102 however, it was later discovered that these hackers were
not state-sponsored actors, but criminal actors nonetheless.103
Voter registration databases are not the only vulnerable targets in the nation’s election infrastructure. Many states’ election websites also lack sufficient cybersecurity
measures to ward off threats from far less sophisticated actors than a hostile nationstate.104 State election websites are the public’s window into the election and the
official source of the election’s results. Therefore, a successful attack on these sites
96
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could be just as damaging to voters’ trust in the election as a hack on the election
systems themselves.105 At least six states had their elections websites targeted by
Russian hackers leading up to the 2016 presidential election.106 In Tennessee, hackers
successfully breached the State’s election website at the time the site was supposed
to begin posting election results, ultimately requiring officials to shut down the site
for repair, preventing voters from seeing the races’ outcomes.107
Demonstrative of state and local election officials’ lack of expertise and resources
to face cybersecurity threats is that most state officials were entirely unaware of the
Russian hacking attempts on their systems for nearly a year.108 All fifty states had
to rely on the federal Department of Homeland Security to notify them if they were
involved in the string of cyber-attacks,109 and even after notification, the scope of
information divulged to state officials and their ability to share those details with
others remain limited.110 The reality is that the majority of state and local election
officials lack the resources to prepare for, identify, and respond to cybersecurity
threats.111 When considered in the context of cyber-attacks organized and supported
by a sophisticated foreign intelligence operation like Russia’s, the logical conclusion
is that, as one former National Security Agency security scientist stated, “[p]rotecting
systems from cyberthreats from nation-states can really only be done on a national
level. It’s insane we have state-level control of these systems.”112
II. FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE ELECTION ADMINISTRATION & SECURITY
Undoubtedly, Congress has the constitutional authority to adopt a more involved
and stringent regulatory stance towards assisting and overseeing state election administration. Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, popularly known
105
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as the Elections Clause, initially vests in the state legislatures the responsibility to
prescribe laws regulating the “Times, Places and Manner” of federal elections.113 However, the Elections Clause also explicitly reserves to Congress the right to “make or
alter such Regulations”114 at any time, with it being “well settled” that state laws concerning the mechanics of federal elections are operative only so far as Congress has
declined to pre-empt them with their own regulatory scheme.115 Indeed, Congress
has successfully invoked this authority to enact pre-emptory election laws and
regulations dealing with voter registration,116 absentee ballots,117 campaign finance,118
and voting rights protections.119 In each of these instances, the Court has held these
laws to be valid exercises of Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause and
that such laws control over a conflicting state law.120
The idea of the federal government becoming more involved in the funding and
oversight of matters relating to election administration is by no means far-fetched,
given that Congress has already interposed itself into this area. In 1993, Congress
enacted the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)121 which was designed to simplify and improve the voter registration process by shifting many of the burdens of
registration from the citizens to the states themselves.122 The NVRA required states
to provide prospective voters with, at minimum, three different opportunities to
register using federally created registration forms,123 established procedural safeguards to govern states’ maintenance of their voter registration lists,124 and provided
113
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for civil enforcement of the Act’s provisions.125 As a response to the Bush v. Gore
controversy, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, a comprehensive statutory framework designed to fund, update, and reform the nation’s
election administration processes.126 Among HAVA’s mandates were that states use
the federal funds to implement and maintain computerized statewide voter registration lists127 and, most importantly for the purposes of this argument, that states upgrade
their voting systems, technology and software that voters use in conformance with
various federal requirements.128
The Court’s approval of laws like the NVRA and HAVA have made clear that
the federal government has a valid interest in the proper administration of federal
elections, however the current system creates significant obstacles to federal efforts
to secure future elections from foreign interference. As the primary administrators
of elections, states are under no obligation to monitor and report cyber-attacks or
issues in their election systems to the federal government.129 Both Congress and the
executive agencies depend on states to voluntarily provide information on matters
of election security, and due to the complexities of cyber-forensic analysis in which
many state officials lack sufficient training, there is a real possibility that states have
or could fail to identify evidence of cyber-attacks, whether attempted or successful.130
This overdependence on states to self-report failures in their own systems impedes
efforts to ascertain a comprehensive and accurate estimate of the nation’s election
infrastructure security.131 Federal officials’ concern that states may choose not to
inform them upon discovery of security breaches or vulnerabilities is not unwarranted,132 and that fear in turn has a chilling effect on the willingness of federal
agencies to share information they have received with Congress and the public.133
In addition to providing funding to the states, HAVA created the Election
Assistance Commission (EAC), an independent, bipartisan federal agency dedicated
125

Id. §§ 20510–20511.
See Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 10, 36, 42, and 52 U.S.C. (2012)).
127
Id. § 303(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 1708–09 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)).
128
Id. § 303(a), 116 Stat. at 1704–05 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21081).
129
See Election Security: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th
Cong. 10 (Mar. 21, 2018) (statement of Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec.’y, Dept. of Homeland Sec.)
[hereinafter S. Hearing on Election Security].
130
See id. at 26; S. REP. SUMMARY ON RUSSIAN TARGETING, supra note 8.
131
See S. Hearing on Election Security, supra note 129, at 28–29; S. REP. SUMMARY ON
RUSSIAN TARGETING, supra note 8.
132
Gary Fineout, Reports of Election Site Hacking Rankle Florida Officials, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/e298a5e7f25847dda4b67ea1b49d0189 [https://
perma.cc/6URT-ZS58]; Nathaniel Herz, Hackers Broke Partway into Alaska’s Election System
in 2016. Officials Say No Damage Was Done, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (May 7, 2018), https://
www.adn.com/politics/2018/05/07/hackers-broke-partway-into-alaskas-election-system-in
-2016-officials-say-no-damage-was-done/#_ [https://perma.cc/QRG3-Z569].
133
S. Hearing on Election Security, supra note 129, at 26.
126

2019]

PROTECTING THE STATES FROM ELECTORAL INVASIONS

213

to establishing election security and technology standards and providing assistance
to the states.134 The EAC promulgates Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG)
outlining specifications to test state voting systems for security, functionality, privacy,
usability, and accessibility.135 Additionally, voting systems and machines can be
tested through a federally accredited Voting Systems Test Laboratory (VSTL) to
certify that they comply with the various federal standards promulgated by the
EAC.136 Hindering the EAC’s ability to bolster election security is the fact that, due
to the states’ primary role in election administration, the EAC’s standards and certifications are entirely voluntary.137 States, and in some jurisdictions, counties, ultimately
set the standards for their voting equipment and often these state and local jurisdictions’ requirements fall below the level that cybersecurity experts recommend.138
Currently, thirty-eight states and Washington D.C. use some aspect of the federal
testing and certification program in addition to state-specific testing and certification
of systems.139 Nine states and Washington D.C. require testing to federal standards,
seventeen states require testing by a federally accredited lab, and twelve states require
full federal certification for their voting systems.140 This leaves eight states with no
federal testing or certification requirements for their voting machines.141 Even more disconcerting is the fact that many of the voting machines currently in use that were
purchased with HAVA funds fail to meet even HAVA’s security standards.142 Despite
HAVA mandating that security standards be promulgated delineating the permissible voting machines that could be bought with the Act’s funds, those final standards
were not issued until 2005 and did not take effect until 2007—well after most states
had already bought their current machines due to the Act’s purchasing deadlines.143
Further complicating nationwide election security is that even when federal
cybersecurity assistance is made available, some states fail to utilize the resources
despite it being in the best interest of the state. Amid a flurry of reports detailing
state-sponsored cyber-attacks aimed at election systems and political parties in the
months leading up to the 2016 election, the Department of Homeland Security
134
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offered states free assistance to help examine and bolster their cybersecurity defenses.144 This offer to state and local officials included a variety of “cyber hygiene”
scans and on-site inspections aimed at assessing vulnerabilities in voter registration
and election systems.145 Nevertheless, eleven states rejected the offer fearing a potential
“federal takeover of elections,” notwithstanding the explicit assurances from DHS
that the services would bring no form of regulation or binding mandates.146
One of those states to reject federal election security assistance was Georgia,147
which, despite having experienced multiple breaches of state systems containing
voter records,148 repeated its denial of federal assistance in the months leading up to
the 2018 mid-term elections.149 As it would turn out, only months after proclaiming
the sufficiency of the state’s election security measures, Georgia’s Secretary of State
Brian Kemp would allege that the state’s election systems were again breached—this
time by his opponent in the gubernatorial race.150
The NVRA and HAVA remain in force today and, although sparsely used, can
serve as the conduit through which the federal government, in conjunction with the
Election Assistance Commission, can easily appropriate and disburse federal funding
to assist the states with election administration and establish minimal cybersecurity
standards and reporting requirements.151 The most recent round of federal funding
in 2018 and the EAC’s ongoing efforts in this area illustrate that the necessary
mechanisms for the federal government to take a more prominent role over election
security are already established. In order to ensure the nation’s elections are truly
secure, the federal government needs to utilize these tools in a manner that is more
consistent and less discretionary, thereby relieving the states from the weighty and
disproportionate burdens that combating hostile foreign actors entails.
Currently, most observers assume that the federal government’s role in election
administration is derived solely from the Elections Clause. Under the text’s explicit
command, Congress has the option to pre-empt state election laws and impose its own
144
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requirements or procedures for federal election administration if it so desires. Beyond
this discretionary constitutional prerogative, however, there lies another provision in the
Constitution whose commands are not optional but rather are obligatory. In a time
where hostile foreign powers are attempting to intrude upon and interfere in the
country’s most fundamental and sovereign activities, an oft-forgotten clause in the
Constitution not only permits Congress to act for the nation’s defense, but it requires
it to do so.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO PROTECT STATE ELECTION
SYSTEMS FROM CYBER-INVASION
Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution states in part: “The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them against Invasion . . . .”152 These two clauses, commonly
referred to as the Guarantee Clause and the Protection Clause, respectively, impose
two distinct yet interrelated obligations on the federal government—to ensure that
every state will have a republican government and to protect every state from threats
of invasion.153 Ongoing attempts by foreign actors to attack and interfere in the U.S.
electoral process are unique in that they implicate and pose a direct threat to both of
these constitutional guarantees. Election systems are the vehicles through which the
states conduct and maintain their republican forms of government.154 When a hostile
foreign actor launches a cyber-attack on state electoral systems and infrastructure,
it should be recognized for what it is—a direct intrusion into one of the most crucial
spheres of state sovereignty and an attack on the states themselves. The states in the
Union are on the front lines in a new era of warfare in which cyberspace is the battlefield, and by leaving the states to fend for themselves, the federal government is
failing to meet its constitutional duties under the Guarantee and Protection Clauses.
A. Cyber-“Invasion”
Undoubtedly, when the Framers originally used the term “invasion” in the Protection Clause they were speaking about a foreign power’s physical intrusion into
a state’s geographical territory.155 It is only natural that the Framers’ conception of
the term would reflect the technology and modes of warfare that existed in the 18th
152
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century. However, the world has experienced monumental advances in technology
since then that even the Framers could not have foreseen, and those developments
have completely transformed the traditional notions of warfare and state sovereignty. Both the U.S. and the international community continue to struggle with how
best to characterize, prepare for, and respond to foreign cyber threats.156 Despite this
uncertainty, in recent years, there has emerged some general consensus as to the role
of cyberspace within the international community and the authority that sovereign
states possess over their own cyber domains.157 As the following principles will
suggest, a modern interpretation of the term “invasion” as it is used in Article IV,
Section 4 should be understood to include cyber-attacks and intrusions into the
United States’ election systems and infrastructure.
First, states retain full sovereignty over the cyberspaces and cyber infrastructures that are located within their territory, thereby enjoying the same rights of selfdefense as that of the air, land, and sea.158 This fundamental notion of cyber sovereignty
and the application of international legal principles to cyberspace has been fully
recognized by the United Nations,159 NATO,160 and the United States government.161
Beyond the right to act in self-defense, the modern conception of state sovereignty
is fundamental within the international community and consequently is understood
to encompass a much broader penumbra of rights and obligations. As stated by the
International Court of Justice in 1986, “[b]etween independent States, respect for
territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations.”162 In
international relations, sovereignty signifies independence, and “[i]ndependence in
regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of
any other State, the functions of a State.”163
Cyber-operations against another state’s infrastructure could constitute a violation of the target state’s sovereignty, regardless of whether that infrastructure is
156
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physical or cyber in nature.164 Additionally, a cyber-operation could constitute an
“intervention,” a “use of force,” or an “armed attack” depending on its purpose, target,
and severity.165 In a report on the international law of cyber warfare, NATO made
clear its view that cyber-attacks which result in damage undoubtedly violate the target
state’s sovereignty.166 However, in that same report, NATO was unable to reach a
conclusion as to whether strictly non-damaging cyber-attacks, such as the installation of malware for monitoring purposes, would constitute a violation of state sovereignty.167 The fact that the 2016 cyber-attacks were primarily aimed at infiltrating
and installing malware on various state election systems for intelligence purposes
makes classifying them within the still developing international legal framework
difficult. Nevertheless, when one looks beyond solely the means employed in the
election related hacking attempts and considers their purpose, scope, and impact as
a whole, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that they and any future attacks of a
similar nature constitute a violation of the United States’ sovereignty.
In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security classified U.S. voter registration
and voting systems as “critical infrastructure.”168 This designation reflects the vitally
important role that electoral infrastructure plays in the country’s security and, despite carrying no regulatory authority in itself, rightfully positions the federal
government to take a more proactive stance in their protection.169 This heightened
role was reaffirmed in a May 2017 executive order stating that it is the executive
branch’s policy “to use its authorities and capabilities to support the cybersecurity risk
management efforts of the owners and operators of the Nation’s critical infrastructure,” to guard the nation’s internet against “disruption, fraud and theft,” to “deter[ ] adversaries,” and to “better protect[ ] the American people from cyber threats.”170
The nation’s election systems exist fully within the United States’ territorial
boundaries and, as such, the U.S. has the sovereign authority to protect and restrict
them from being accessed by individuals outside the nation’s borders.171 The fact that
164
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some states’ election systems are operated or controlled by private vendors has no
bearing on this determination, as state sovereignty protects cyber infrastructure belonging to the government and private entities alike.172 Similarly, while traditional
violations of sovereignty were seen as limited to actions undertaken by, or attributable to, state actors, the modern view is that even cyber-operations conducted by
non-state actors may also violate a state’s territorial sovereignty.173 According to the
International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally
Wrongful Acts of 2001, “[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons
is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State
in carrying out the conduct.”174
Illustrative of the complexities and dangers that state-sponsored cyber-attacks
pose to existing notions of warfare, state sovereignty, and international law is the
2014 hacking of Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc. (Sony), which the FBI concluded
to have been orchestrated by the North Korean government.175 Angered by the U.S.based entertainment company’s production and upcoming release of the film The
Interview, a comedy based around a fictitious plot to assassinate North Korean leader
Kim Jong Un, the North Korean government made clear to the U.S. and the international community that they viewed the film as nothing short of “undisguised
sponsor[ing] of terrorism” and an “act of war” for which unspecified countermeasures
would be taken if the U.S. government did not intervene to shut down the film.176
In the months following these unsuccessful attempts at intimidation, a thenunidentified group calling themselves the “Guardians of Peace” (GOP) launched a
series of sophisticated cyber-attacks targeting Sony’s internal networks, information,
and files.177 The hackers were successfully able to obtain an “insane” amount of
Sony’s internal corporate information, ranging from unpublished scripts, detailed
financial data on all of Sony’s recent films, confidential release dates, and even
entire films that were not yet released.178 The data stolen not only contained massive
172
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amounts of proprietary information, but also large quantities of employees and their
families’ personal and financial data including personal bank accounts, email addresses, phone numbers, passwords, birth dates, social security numbers, medical
histories, salaries, and even passports and visas.179 The hackers took all of this
private data and posted it to publicly accessible file sharing websites, all the while
contacting Sony employees and officials warning them to cancel the “movie of
terrorism[’s]” planned release or face further consequences.180
Subsequent to the data dump and accompanying threats, Sony cancelled its
planned release of The Interview, after which the hackers again contacted Sony—
this time to praise what they called a “very wise decision.”181 Throughout these
events, North Korea repeatedly denied its involvement but nonetheless praised the
operation, calling it a “righteous deed.”182 Contrary to their denials, the FBI ultimately concluded that the North Korean government was in fact responsible for the
operation, stating that the attack was “intended to inflict significant harm on a U.S.
business and suppress the right of American citizens to express themselves.”183 Then
President Obama, whose office had already labeled the matter “a serious national
security issue,” publicly endorsed the FBI’s conclusion that North Korea was responsible and criticized Sony for not going forward with the movie’s planned release.184
In the end, Sony did release The Interview as originally scheduled, albeit in a limited
screening in select theaters only.185
The similarities between the 2014 Sony hack and the 2016 election hacks are
striking, and the international and domestic reactions to the former are helpful in
understanding and characterizing the latter. Indeed, each involves cyber-operations
launched by non-state actors but who were largely believed to have been supported,
if not directed, by hostile foreign powers.186 These cyber-attacks were not done to
cause physical damage or injury to people, objects, or infrastructure in the traditional, tangible sense of offensive warfare.187 Rather, their goal was intangible and
ideologically motivated—to target U.S. companies and citizens and obtain private
information that could be weaponized to disrupt constitutionally protected rights and
interfere in sovereign processes for political gain.188
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The 2014 Sony hack raised considerable debate in the international community
over the sufficiency of existing laws governing cyberwarfare because it demonstrated the “increasingly important dual role of information as both a target and a
highly effective weapon capable of causing considerable damage.”189 Commentators
remarked how the controlling weight given to cyber-attacks’ physical consequences
under current international law impedes the ability of states like the U.S. to respond
to these sorts of intangible yet still highly damaging state-sponsored operations.190
Nonetheless, under the prevailing norms and understanding of international law at
that time, it is hard to argue that the Sony hack constituted a “cyber use of force” or
“cyber intervention,” each for its own specific reason respectively.191 First, the cyberoperation lacked the sort of physical consequences and tangible injuries that is
characteristic of a use of force in international law.192 Second, the target of the hack
was aimed primarily at the operations of a single private company to influence or
harm their business.193 This result seemingly falls short of the International Court of
Justice’s conception of intervention as interference in a state’s “political, economic,
social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.”194
In comparison to the Sony hack, designating the 2016 election interference
hacks as, at least, an intervention under international law is much more palatable.
Whereas the Sony hack was (relatively) contained to the data and information of a
single private company, the 2016 hacks targeted a wide array of private companies,
government entities, and private citizens—all of whom were intimately connected
to the United States’ electoral processes.195 Whereas the Sony hack’s ultimate goal
was to coerce a privately owned business into making a certain commercial decision,196 the 2016 hacks had a much grander design: a comprehensive and ongoing
misinformation campaign designed to influence American public opinion and U.S.
democratic processes.197 Such a campaign clearly and explicitly intends to interfere
with the United States’ sovereign right to self-determine its own “political, economic,
social,” cultural, and foreign policies—the exact definition of “intervention” articulated by the International Court of Justice.198
189
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B. Framers’ Intent
Undoubtedly, the term “invasion” as originally used in the Protection Clause was
speaking of some sort of physical intrusion into a states’ territorial boundaries.199
The Framers never could have imagined a world in which a hostile foreign nation
could wreak untold havoc on the nation’s physical infrastructure and democratic
institutions without ever having stepped foot onto United States soil.200 Despite this,
examining the Framers’ underlying rationale for their adoption of the Protection
Clause through the lens of modern warfare and threats illustrates how these types
of cyber intrusions implicate the same concerns as Article IV, Section 4 was intended to address some 300 years ago.
Having only narrowly won their independence in the Revolutionary War and
being certain that more threats would arise down the road, maintaining the security
of the fledgling United States was a principal concern for the Framers at the 1787
Constitutional Convention.201 Over the course of the Revolutionary War, key failures
in the Articles of Confederation concerning the federal government’s power to defend
the nation as a whole became apparent.202 The federal government was essentially
powerless to provide and act for the common defense as its authority was contingent
on the voluntary acquiescence and contributions of the individual states.203 On their
own, states were either unable or unwilling to sufficiently handle security threats,
a trend that James Madison believed was not borne out of a lack of concern for their
security, but because sufficient security measures were “too difficult and expensive
for one state to provide.”204 When the dangers existed outside of their boundaries,
states were even more recalcitrant to support national security measures because
they did not directly “benefit their own constituents.”205 Speaking on this issue,
Alexander Hamilton wrote, “[s]tates near the seat of war, influenced by motives of
self preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their
abilities, while those at a distance from danger were for the most part as remiss as
the others were diligent in their exertions.”206
States’ willingness to contribute to the defense of their neighbors remained
dormant until it was perceived to be in their own best interest, but the Framers knew
that such an every-state-for-themselves mentality would prove disastrous for the
United States’ security as a whole.207 Invasions and attacks could not be easily
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

See Mazzone, supra note 153, at 48–52.
See Lotrionte, supra note 156, at 833.
Mazzone, supra note 153, at 37, 40.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 39–40.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 138 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
See Mazzone, supra note 153, at 40–47.

222

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:197

confined to one state and would inevitably have negative spillover effects on the
economies, stability, and security of nearby states and the nation overall.208 The
Framers viewed these issues as presenting a “collective-action dilemma,” where no
state wanted to contribute its fair share to the collective security effort of the nation,
even though each state was likely to be worse off as a result.209 The Articles of
Confederation relied upon the goodwill of states to contribute to the nation’s security,
a reliance which Alexander Hamilton described as “ill founded and illusory.”210
The Protection Clause was intended to remedy the collective-action dilemma,
removing from states the primary responsibility of defending themselves against
foreign threats and instead entrusting the federal government with the authority and
obligation to do so.211 Alexander Hamilton argued that the national government,
being “representative of the whole,” would “feel itself most deeply interested in the
preservation of every part” and would “best understand the extent and urgency of
the dangers that threaten.”212 By granting the federal government the authority to
defend all of the states, it would be able to “establish uniformity and concert in the
plans and measures by which the common safety is to be secured.”213 Once made
“the guardian of the common safety,” Hamilton continued, the scope of the federal
government’s power must not be restricted for allowing states to dictate what resources the federal government could deploy would lead to “weakness, disorder, an
undue distribution of the burthens and calamities of war, [and] an unnecessary and
intolerable increase of expence . . . .”214
In a Constitution that focused on security as much as it did on “governmental
structures and individual rights,” the Protection Clause was regarded as an essential
component.215 It reflects the Framers’ view that the states cannot and should not be
left to defend against hostile foreign actors through their own devices.216 That burden
should instead fall upon the federal government, which has the resources, expertise,
and authority to provide the robust and uniform defenses needed to ensure the
nation’s security.217 Over the last two centuries, traditional notions of warfare and
threats posed by foreign actors have evolved dramatically, and yet the original rationale and purpose envisioned for the Protection Clause are as relevant and applicable as ever. The ongoing threats from foreign attacks on state election systems
and overall vulnerabilities in the nation’s electoral infrastructure implicate the same
concerns which the Framers intended to address through the Protection Clause.
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Hostile actors, backed by foreign intelligence and military agencies are targeting
and launching highly sophisticated and organized cyber-attacks on state election
systems and infrastructure with the intent to intrude and disrupt the nation’s democratic institutions.218 As it stands today, the primary responsibility to prepare, detect,
and defend against these attempted cyber-intrusions falls on state and local officials
who overwhelmingly lack the requisite resources, experience, and technical knowledge to defend themselves.219 This fear that security would ultimately prove too
difficult and expensive for the individual states to provide was squarely in the minds
of the Framers when they adopted the Protection Clause.220 Both James Madison221
and Alexander Hamilton wrote at length about the dangers of leaving states to fund
and provide for their own security measures, warning that doing so was “[a] project
oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the confederacy.”222
The Framers’ concerns that states wouldn’t possess the financial and experiential
resources to provide for their own security have only been exacerbated in the context
of election security. The nation’s election systems are comprised of highly complex
IT systems with “thousands of endpoints and back-end systems that hold and process
large volumes of highly sensitive data,” and securing them is no easy feat.223 Unlike
conventional invasions, cyber-attacks can intrude and interfere with state-run systems without ever having physically entered a state’s borders, and without sufficient
cybersecurity and cyber-forensics training these attacks can—and have—been
carried out without state and local officials detecting them.224 During and after the
2016 election, the states had to rely on the federal government for information because while they “understood that there was a cyber threat, [they] did not appreciate
the scope, seriousness, or implications of the serious threat they were facing.”225
The states’ dependence is wholly consistent with Hamilton’s characterization
of the national government as the “center of information” which would “best understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten.”226 The federal government’s
ability to act as the “center of information”227 and to accurately assess the nation’s
election security is impeded, however, when states are left with discretion as to
whether they will share information with them or to accept their security assistance
when it is offered.228 Hamilton foresaw this exact issue and intended for the Protection
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Clause to prevent it by making the scope of the national government’s power to
provide for the common defense clear, obligatory, and unrestricted.229 Much of the
Framers’ concerns about varying levels of state security were premised on the fear
that certain states with the most resources, like New York, would be the most
attractive targets for invasion and therefore would be unable to meet their disproportionate burden in furnishing security.230 Since invasions and their negative effects
would be difficult to contain within a single state, “[t]he security of all would . . . be
subjected to the parsimony, improvidence or inability of a part.”231
Again, the Framers’ concerns about the shortcomings of one state affecting the
security of the nation can be seamlessly applied to the election security context where
the outcome of a national election is often decided by a small number of states. In
this context, battleground states like Pennsylvania, Florida, and Wisconsin are
synonymous with the resource-rich states like New York in that they are attractive
targets for foreign interference attempts and if their security measures are lacking,
that could potentially affect, or at least undermine, the electoral process of the nation
as a whole.232 Many battleground states and counties within those states are known
to have insufficient election security measures in place today and, due to intrastate
politics and financial deficiencies, that fact is unlikely to change without being
pushed by the authority of the federal government.233
C. Textual Support
The language and composition of the guarantees contained in Article IV,
Section 4 lend additional support to expanding the common understanding of the
national government’s duty to defend against invasion to encompass the realm of
election security. The Framers debated at length the specific terms used to articulate
the contours of the obligations imposed on the federal government and the rights
reserved to the states.234 The Protection Clause and the preceding Guarantee Clause
are notable in that they each impose affirmative, perpetual, and independent obligations on the national government: “The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion.”235 “Shall means must,” and by assuring these two things to every
229
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state without any mention of conditional prerequisites, these provisions dictate that
the federal government is breaching its duty if they fail even one state.236 In stark
contrast with the Protection Clause, the language contained at the end of Section 4
regarding the national government’s obligation to protect the states from domestic
violence is only triggered upon “Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive.”237
The fact the Framers chose to differentiate the national government’s defensive
responsibilities between these two different threats shows that when dealing with invasions, the Framers viewed the national government’s protective duty as constant—it
must ensure every states’ security whether the state wishes to acquiesce or not.238
The word “guarantee” itself takes on a special significance when one considers
how that term was used in eighteenth century international law and treaties, shedding
further light on what the Framers’ understood it to mean. While the 1787 Constitution
was inherently a document geared towards the collective security of the nation as a
whole,239 its structure largely respected the individual states as independent sovereigns
in their own right.240 As such, in establishing the relationships between the states
themselves and between the states and the national government, the Constitution and
its provisions were very likely influenced by the principles which governed international law at the time it was adopted.241 In fact, during the formative years of the
nation, “both state and federal” courts “looked to international law principles” to
address constitutional issues relating to “border disputes, interstate jurisdiction . . .
extradition . . . and sovereign immunity.”242 Looking to how “guarantee” was used
in eighteenth century international law, it was frequently “used to signify a reciprocal promise between contracting nations to safeguard [the] rights, privileges or
territories” of one another from foreign interference.243 It also was not unusual for
contracting sovereigns to guarantee the others’ “adherence to and recognition of
certain internal governmental arrangements,”244 representing not “something new
but rather ‘a warrant and defense’ of something that already exists.”245 James Madison
himself spoke of the Guarantee Clause’s value as guarding against “experiments” that
“may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising
leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers.”246
Against this backdrop, Article IV, Section 4 can be easily read as promising to
the individual sovereign states the United States as a “guarantor” of their republican
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government structure, bound to employ whatever means might be necessary to defend
against all perceived threats.247 This reading is further supported by the fact that
Article IV, Section 4 is the only place in the Constitution which confers a certain
responsibility on the “United States” itself in its collective, corporate capacity.248
Thus, the relationship between the states and the national government created by the
Guarantee Clause and the proceeding Protection Clause is that of a treaty, entitling
the sovereign states to the assistance of the national government while preserving
their own sovereignty and autonomy.249
Beyond its terminology, the composition of Article IV, Section 4 and its overall
placement within the Constitution both shed further light on its purported scope for
the government’s duty to secure the states’ security. The Guarantee and Protection
Clauses are contained in Article IV, which lays out the contours of the states’ relationships with the federal government and with one another.250 Many of the Article’s
provisions deal with subjects long dealt with through “international treaties between
sovereign nations,” provisions which were primarily designed to minimize “potential sources of friction between the . . . states and to bind [them] into a more cohesive . . . union.”251 As a whole, Article IV’s goal was to promote harmony and some
semblance of uniformity between the states because the Framers’ were concerned
that issues in one state would inevitably have spillover effects on neighboring states,
thus harming the nation’s security as a whole.252
Section 4’s language itself is notable in that it requires the United States to
guarantee each state a “Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of
them against Invasion.”253 These two obligations, security and republican government, are linked, reflecting the Framers’ view that a democratic government ruled
by the people “is impossible to achieve and sustain without security.”254 To ensure
these fundamental, coexisting elements of democracy would not be hampered by
financial insufficiencies, political squabbles, or foreign interference, the Framers
imposed on the national government an unqualified and unrestrained duty to maintain their existence.255
Election security and the rise in foreign election interference attempts are unique
in that they directly implicate both of these constitutional guarantees. Elections are
the engine through which the states operate and maintain their republican forms of
government, and when foreign powers attempt to attack, interfere, or otherwise
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influence the electoral process, they are attempting to invade one of the most
fundamental liberties that a sovereign state possesses: the right to self-determine its
own government. If the Framers intended for the national government to independently serve as both the perpetual guarantor of the states’ republican government and
their unconditional defender from foreign invasions, it takes no logical hurdle to
conclude that the national government cannot leave states as the primary guards against
foreign interference attempts against the country’s democratic processes.
CONCLUSION
Foreign interference in U.S. elections is not going anywhere, and it poses a real
threat to American democracy and to the United States’ national security overall. States
have been constitutionally entrusted with the authority to oversee and administer elections within their jurisdictions, and such a decentralized system is undoubtedly one
of the best defenses against foreign interference.256 Separating key electoral infrastructure into thousands of independent systems inherently contains and prevents
security breaches from having widespread consequences outside of the affected
jurisdiction.257 Aside from the benefits, however, the current system also has inherent
flaws that foreign powers can—and have—exploited to intrude upon our elections.258
Disparities in funding and minimum cybersecurity standards, lack of training and
expertise, and the voluntary nature of reporting and sharing information between
state and federal officials act as a severe impediment to the nation’s ability to combat
election interference.259
Despite having no conception of a threat such as this in the late eighteenth
century, the Framers did, in a sense, include a provision applicable to the problems
we face today. The Framers knew that leaving the nation’s defense to the inexperienced and ill-equipped states would result in a collective security dilemma, wherein
the shortcomings of one would inevitably spillover to the detriment of the whole.260
Instead, they had the foresight to charge the national government with the duty to
defend all states from foreign influences, equally.261 Illustrative of how essential
they viewed this duty to defend, the Framers placed it directly after the duty to
guarantee each state a republican form of government—the critical ingredient to
American democracy.262 The Framers would be aghast to find that the national
government, citing principles of federalism, is now leaving state and local officials
as the principal defenders against hostile foreign powers attempting to infiltrate and
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undermine their most sacred of democratic traditions. No less than the Framers would
have expected the national government to assist a state in preventing a foreign power
from invading on election day to stuff the ballot box, they too would expect the
federal government to lend aid when the same result is attempted through intangible
means. The Constitution demands more to be done, and the federal government
already possesses the necessary tools to provide more consistent federal funding,
personnel training, and mandatory minimum-security requirements. In so doing, the
federal government can be confident that its conduct falls squarely within the realm
contemplated for it by the Framers and the Constitution.

